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CIRIS

6 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Pentagon Meetings

1. The purpose of this memo is to summarize the substance of discussions held in the Pentagon this date with Mr. Jim Vance and VAdm Bowen. The conversations concerned (a) CIRIS, (b) the OMB Concept Paper, and (c) ASD(I)-DCI/IC staff relationships.

2. On the subject of CIRIS, Jim Vance now predicts that Dr. Hall will disapprove any data call for 1972. Vance discussed CIRIS with Dr. Hall on Monday, 3 April, and was given instructions to prepare a letter to the DCI stating his intention not to approve a data call among DOD elements. In spite of these rather explicit instructions, it is Vance's intention to prepare three letters: (1) representing the specific instructions, (2) indicating approval of a partial data call (forms 2812 and 2812b) but not to include forms 2812a calling for target data, and (3) approve issuance of the full data call as requested by DCI/IC.

3. Vance hoped to "sell" option (2) or (3) by accompanying his presentation with an explanatory memo on DCI/IC-ASD(I) staff relationships and procedures. This memo would describe these relationships in a favorable light based primarily on the draft DCI/IC/CG operating plan, which Vance considers to be a reasonable and workable procedure. He intends to describe the procedures of this draft plan against the back drop of the OMB concept paper, which is violently opposed by OSD (see below). It was thus Vance's hope that he could persuade Dr. Hall to relax his earlier oral turn-down of the CIRIS data call. Tactically, he was going to support letter alternative (3) in hopes of gaining approval at least of letter alternative (2).

4. However, the telephone inquiry on CIRIS which Dr. Hall received on Tuesday or Wednesday from Mr. Tweedy apparently served to reinforce Dr. Hall's earlier decision and he directed

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

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Vance to draft the letter response as soon as possible. Vance will see Hall Friday morning with the three letters and the staff memo, and Vance told me he will still advocate approval of the data call, but he is practically certain that Dr. Hall will insist on signing letter version (1) denying a data call. His premise is that he cannot justify to the SecDef the need for such extensive data in light of the budget review and presentation procedures outlined in the OMB concept paper. In other words, to agree to the data call would place Dr. Hall in a position of aiding and abetting a procedure which the SecDef clearly opposes, a procedure which Dr. Hall believes the DCI had a part in devising.

5. As to the OMB paper, it was received in the Pentagon under a "Dear Mel" letter signed by George Shultz. The letter did not ask for comments, and the paper is being interpreted in OSD as having directive force. The particular problem lies in the penultimate paragraph. This reads as follows:

"Following submission of the CIPB and completion of the joint review, OMB will prepare review materials for consideration by the President. The President's decisions will then be transmitted to Defense, CIA, and State as appropriate for incorporation into the on-going budget process."

6. Vance explained that the total Defense budget is historically carried to the President by the SecDef and not through OMB. Apparently it is the only government budget so handled, all others going through OMB. Thus, OSD views the OMB paper relative to intelligence as being a deliberate attempt by OMB to break this routine, and Mr. Laird, Mr. Moot and Dr. Hall are determined that this will not occur.

7. As a result, and in view of the suspicion held by some that DCI participated in the preparation of the OMB paper, it is currently Dr. Hall's intention that no program-wide data (such as represented by CIRIS) will be provided to the DCI, and that DCI will not be invited to participate in the CDIP Review, the formulation of the PDM, or in the subsequent budget review.

8. The draft DCI/IC/CG plan on the other hand plays down the consolidated intelligence budget and describes instead a National Intelligence Program Memorandum (NIPM) which would discuss the total program, the magnitude of resources and program issues, but would be devoid of an actual consolidated budget prepared for Presidential consideration. Defense can

CONFIDENTIAL

accept the NIPM process but rejects outright the CIPB concept of OMB.

9. I explained as convincingly as I could the evolution of the OMB paper as I knew it, and denied DCI participation. This was accepted and believed by Vance and Admiral Bowen but, according to Vance, would not be accepted by Dr. Hall. Vance desires an official version of the DCI/IC/CG plan as soon as possible in order to describe authoritatively the DCI concept of the NIPM process rather than a CIPB.

10. The matter of ASD(I)-DCI/IC staff relationships is largely covered above. As noted, if the OMB concept paper stands, ASD(I) will not invite DCI/IC staff participation in the scheduled review events from July through October. Instead, it is their intention only to provide DCI/IC with appropriate decision documents after their review and approval. It is their intention to treat OMB in the same manner.



D. M. Showers